Women and the Struggle for Power in Post-Assad Syria

In Syria, women rallied with YPJ flags to demand that Damascus respect women’s rights. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December marked a turning point in the governance of Syria. In its place, a new interim government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, is leading efforts to rebuild state institutions and restore basic services. Al-Sharaa was the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni rebel group who maintained extensive military and political power and coordinated the offensive that pushed Assad to flee the state. Al-Sharaa announced the new cabinet Saturday, March 29, promising greater diversity and inclusion in decision-making positions in this “strong” post-Assad era. 

On paper, Syria’s authorities have made commitments to gender equality. A newly ratified constitutional declaration was created to facilitate a five-year transitional period that included language guaranteeing women the right to education, work, and political participation. Al-Sharaa called this declaration the beginning of “a new history.” But for many Syrian women who are hesitant to both Assad and HTS, these changes raise more questions than answers. Can Syria’s next political chapter be stable without prioritizing the full inclusion of women in its political and social reconstruction?

A critical examination of the transition reveals troubling early signs. While the constitutional declaration outlines "social, political and economic rights" for women, the sincerity of the commitment to these rights has been perceived by some as dismissive of the demands of Syrian women. For example, the initial appointment of Aisha al-Dibs to lead the Women’s Affairs Office was hailed as progress–until she framed the role of women in society strictly within Islam and the family unit. This narrow vision for female empowerment contradicts the broader equal rights promised in the transitional constitution by institutionalizing and reinforcing this restrictive narrative. This disconnect raises concerns that these reforms are largely symbolic, signaling a shift toward an ideologically-driven government that may limit genuine progress for women’s rights.

Critics from the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava, have outright rejected the new constitutional declaration, calling it unrepresentative of women’s rights and their political participation. In Rojava, women have been at the forefront of both military resistance and civil governance for years, chanting “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” (Women, Life, Freedom) as part of their women-centered society. The Kurdish feminist philosophy “jineology” emphasizes women’s liberation as central to democracy. While the national transitional government has taken steps to include women in leadership positions and legal codes within the constitution, its approach is still rooted in conservative interpretations of gender roles. In contrast to this, Rojava’s institutions prioritize co-leadership in politics and hold women’s councils as integral parts of community decision-making. It places women’s liberation at the heart of social transformation, arguing that no society can be truly free without the freedom of women. Sharia courts have been disbanded in Rojava following their revolution, demonstrating a practical commitment to women’s empowerment.

This localized model presents a challenge to the transitional government in Damascus. If the central state fails to incorporate women into political processes–or worse, reverts to conservative rhetoric and ideology–it risks alienating a generation of women who have already experienced autonomy but have also borne witness to gender-based violence. Suppressing these hard-fought gains could incite widespread civil unrest, especially in regions like Rojava where women played key roles in military operations, post-conflict recovery, and everyday governance. As al-Sharaa’s government seeks to prove itself to Syrian minorities and the international community, a wave of civil unrest led by women as a result of these restrictions could threaten its already fragile standing. This could especially endanger their support amongst ethnic minority groups like the Druze and Yezidis, as newly-appointed cabinet members from these communities are trusted as representatives to the state. A perceived failure to address their concerns could weaken their trust, in addition to the weakened trust among women. 

In fact, Syria may already be primed for its own version of the 2022 Mahsa Amini movement. Mahsa Amini– a young Kurdish woman– died in police custody for allegedly violating Islamic hijab laws. What began as a Kurdish expression of grievance, “Women, Life, Freedom” soon became a chant for a global women’s movement. Much like Iran, Syria is witnessing the consolidation of a government that claims social and political progress while actively reproducing conservative narratives on women’s societal roles.  If the new Syrian government continues to marginalize women, especially those who played major roles in the revolution and in rebuilding their communities, it risks igniting a similar response—a feminist-led call for dignity and justice that shakes Syria’s efforts for stability. Reversing the political gains of women in regions like Rojava could evolve into a regional, minority-led uprising demanding women’s freedom and structural reform.

Unlike Iran, Syria has not yet institutionalized Sharia law, but if the new government takes this step, it would shake Rojava’s “Women, Life, Freedom” philosophy to its core, threatening to erase an existing system where women’s autonomy has been realized. The lessons of the Mahsa Amini movement remain clear: when states fail to include their most vulnerable and politically active populations, both regime and constituent stability is at stake.

International actors involved in Syria’s reconstruction should also take note. Foreign aid and diplomatic recognition must be tied to concrete commitments to human rights– this includes gender equity. Support for grassroots women’s organizations will be essential in sustaining momentum toward genuine reform. For Syrians and the government alike, the stakes are existential. As Syria now faces the challenge of rebuilding, the future of its legitimacy and peace hinges on whether it chooses to uphold the rights of women in every governing institution, street, and home. In this way, jineology is now a warning. A Syria that sidelines women is not a Syria at peace.

A New Lebanese Cabinet Has Filled a Years-Long Political Vacuum

A handout picture released by the Lebanese presidency shows Lebanon's newly formed cabinet, led by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam (center-right), posing for a group photo,along with President Joseph Aoun (center), Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (center-left) and cabinet members at the presidential palace, on February 11, 2025. (Lebanese Presidency / AFP)

Since the start of 2025, the government of Lebanon has undergone a significant political shift away from Hezbollah. Within the first two months of the year, Lebanon has appointed a president, ousted the Hezbollah-backed prime minister, and established the first full cabinet in over two years. The president’s appointment marks the end of a parliamentary deadlock that started in October 2022, while the new cabinet is the first one since 2008 that Hezbollah’s party does not have a majority in. 

This new government is the latest in a series of political developments in Lebanon that indicate a shift in power away from Hezbollah. On January 9, after two rounds of parliamentary voting and robust U.S. and Saudi support, Joseph Aoun was elected to the Lebanese presidency, ending a years-long presidential vacuum. In addition to being close to Washington and Riyadh, Aoun has been vocal about his displeasure with the way the Hezbollah-backed caretaker cabinet handled the Lebanese economic crisis. 

Aoun’s election is not the only political blow Hezbollah has taken recently. On the 13th of January, two-thirds of the Lebanese Parliament voted to elect former ICJ president Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister. This further weakened Hezbollah’s influence in the state, as Salam’s appointment replaced Hezbollah-backed Prime Minister Najib Mikati. 

The new Lebanese cabinet follows this trend. On February 8, after three weeks of political negotiations between Lebanon’s rival political parties, Aoun announced he had accepted the resignation of the caretaker cabinet and signed a decree with Salam forming a new cabinet. When addressing the press, Salam said that the twenty-four member cabinet would focus on reconstruction, ending Lebanon’s six-year-long economic crisis, and implementing UN Resolution 1701. The resolution, commonly called the “linchpin of peace” in the region, calls for a Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the creation of the Blue Line–a “line of withdrawal” operated by ten thousand UN peacekeepers. Salam also said that the new cabinet would prioritize the enforcement of a 2024 ceasefire deal that aims to end the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel on Lebanon’s southern border by the 18th of February.

These political developments do not mean that Hezbollah has been completely expelled from Lebanon’s government. In fact, during the three-week negotiation process, Hezbollah engaged in negotiations with Salam over who would hold the Shi’ite Muslim seats in the cabinet. At the end of negotiations, Hezbollah’s political ally, the Amal movement—led by Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri—was able to choose four of the cabinet members, including the new minister of finance, and give its approval for a fifth. 

While this influence was enough for the U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East to speak out against Hezbollah's role in the cabinet, the group’s influence has still significantly diminished. Most decisions in the Lebanese cabinet need a two-thirds majority to pass, and Hezbollah does not occupy the necessary number of seats to have a “blocking third”—meaning a third plus one—in the cabinet. The lack of a blocking third means that Aoun, Salam, and Lebanon’s cabinet will be able to pass legislation without Hezbollah’s support. 

The past sixteen months have greatly weakened Hezbollah's strength. From Israeli warfare killing their top officials, to the overthrow of Assad’s regime in Syria, and now with the recent political losses, the group’s regional presence is on the retreat. Hezbollah’s influence in the region is still present,but with a new Lebanese cabinet focused on reform and building stability, the group may face increasing difficulty as they try to re-establish their control.

What To Expect From al-Sharaa in Syria

Ahmed al-Sharaa; Credit: Aref Tammawi—AFP/Getty Images

On January 29, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa declared himself interim president of Syria for the duration of the government's transitional phase. His formal declaration as president comes as no surprise, as he has been the de facto leader of the country since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a military coup and ousted Bashar al-Assad, bringing an end to the Assad dynasty’s 50-year long rule. 

HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, was founded under the leadership of Sharaa, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, in 2011 as an affiliate of al-Qaeda. However, in 2016, al-Jolani broke ties with al-Qaeda and a year later, merged with other groups to establish HTS to defeat the Assad regime. 

Understanding the fall of the Assad state, despite their historic grip on power, we can look at two factors. First, the power of the Syrian state has been eroded by years of war, sanctions, and corruption. Second, the military strength of the regime’s most influential allies, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, has been significantly weakened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the ongoing regional-Israeli war has depleted key resources from these states. Thus, when the HTS military launched their offensive attack on the Assad regime, the state was too weak to fight back and their allies were too diminished to intervene. 

As the new Syrian president Sharaa took office, he announced his plans for the transitional government. His first priority is to fill Syria’s power vacuum in government “in a legitimate and legal way” by rebuilding state institutions. Specifically, the reconstruction of the military and the development of economic infrastructure. This is crucial because studies have shown peace to be extremely fragile in states where power vacuums leave the government incapable of providing citizens necessary goods or services. Sharaa’s first step to fill the gap in leadership was the empowerment of a legislative council to draft a new legal code, replacing the suspended 2012 constitution and establishing a framework for transitional justice. 

One of the first things Sharaa announced in office was the pursuit of transitional justice against “the criminals who shed Syrian blood and committed massacres and crimes.” Although his exact perpetrators are unspecified, he is likely referring to the political and military elite who targeted civilians during the ongoing Syrian civil war. In 2010, pro-democracy protests swept across the country as part of a larger regional movement called the Arab Spring. However, Assad responded with force, firing unarmed protesters and carrying out mass arrests. The peaceful movement transformed into a still-ongoing civil war, with casualties now reaching over half a million. The international community has responded by condemning the atrocities and human rights violations the regime has committed throughout the conflict.

Despite Sharaa’s vow to preserve “civil peace,” the safety of international refugees remains uncertain. As a result of the civil war, Syria has become the world’s largest refugee crisis, with an estimated 14 million civilians forced to flee. This is broken down into 7.4 million internally displaced persons; 5.5 million in the neighboring countries of Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt; and 850,000 in Germany. Immediately after Assad’s regime was toppled, many European countries pressed to return Syrian refugees to their home country. Additionally, others have stopped processing Syrian asylum applications. 

However, with the state’s political fragility, analysts have argued against this move. First, the influx of returning Syrians would add pressure to the transitional government and could undermine the prospect of a successful transition. This is further exacerbated by the collapse of the Syrian pound due to political instability and a loss of investor confidence. Finally, the destruction from the war has destroyed the housing market, with entire neighborhoods in ruin. As such, the country would be ill-prepared  to house an influx of returning Syrian refugees. 

What does this all mean for Bashar al-Assad? Immediately after HTS assumed power, the leader fled the country to Russia. Yet recent negotiations between Syria’s interim government and Russian President Vladimir Putin signal that his asylum may not be secure. Since 2015, Russia has had a military presence in the state, and although there has been a transition in the political apparatus, it is too valuable for them to surrender. The Syrian state is particularly valuable because of its strategic geography and intrinsic wealth. That said, Russia has declined to comment on whether they would return Assad in order to secure their position.

Ultimately, the fate of the nation is extremely fragile and in an unpredictable position. Sharaa currently enjoys popular support, but should positive change not come soon, his grasp on power could be quickly undermined. Such a herculean national project requires the support of the international community, particularly lifting Assad-era sanctions to foster their economy and empower economic growth. With international support, Syria has the opportunity to embark on a path to recovery, but without external support, the window of opportunity could be lost. 

The Israeli-Palestinian Ceasefire

Photo credit: Rex/Shutterstock (left) and Bloomberg (right)

On January 15, a ceasefire was reached between Israel and Hamas after 15 months of war. This deal aims to end the war in Gaza and facilitate the return of Israeli hostages captured by Hamas in the October 7 invasion of southern Israel. 

There are three stages to the ceasefire deal, but as of now, the second and third stages have only been agreed upon in principle. The first stage began on January 19 and is set to last 42 days. During this initial stage, a ceasefire will commence and Israeli forces will leave populated areas of Gaza, allowing humanitarian aid to enter and displaced Palestinians to return. Hamas will then release 33 hostages–children, women, elderly, and wounded–and in exchange, Israel will release 1,900 Palestinian prisoners. In the second stage, the permanent ceasefire will become official and younger Israeli male hostages will be exchanged for more Palestinian prisoners. In the third and final stage, the bodies of dead hostages will be returned, Israeli troops will commit to a complete withdrawal of Gaza, and the reconstruction process will begin. 

As of this article’s publication, 18 Israeli hostages have been released as per the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Of the 18 released, 5 were Thai nationals and 10 Israeli citizens–5 female soldiers, 4 women, and 3 men. In return for the released hostages, Israel has released around 600 Palestinian prisoners. Among those individuals was the high-profile terrorist, Zakaria Zubeidi, a former leader of the Fatah militant wing al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, who was involved in deadly attacks targeting civilians during the Second Intifada. 

Both sides have different factors that coalesced to help explain the timing of this agreement. Hamas suffered a major blow with the death of their leader Yahya Al-Sinwar in October. Additionally, some argue that their attack on October 7th was intended to trigger a regional war, an idea that looks increasingly unlikely. The support they once garnered from Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance” has been significantly weakened with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the severe setbacks suffered by Hezbollah. Finally, as argued by some scholars, such as Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, they may have already achieved their goal: provocation. Knowing that the Netanyahu government is hawkish, they may have seen this as a chance to provoke the Israelis into responding with indiscriminate repression that could garner support for their side. As we have seen, global support for Israel has dropped significantly since the war in Gaza began.

Looking at Israel, two events are crucial to understanding the motivation behind Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s acceptance of the deal despite past resistance. First, the ceasefire brokered between Israel and Lebanon in November heightened demands by Qatari, Egyptian, and U.S. mediators to negotiate the war in Gaza. Second, there was a significant increase in pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to office, as he warned of “hell to pay” if the deal was not reached before his inauguration. 

Despite the pressure on Netanyahu to accept the deal, the security of the second and third phases of the ceasefire is incredibly fragile. Many have assessed that neither side is ready to stop fighting. With Gaza destroyed and left with no viable political alternative to Hamas, the opportunity cost to resume fighting is low. In Israel, Netanyahu has already addressed the ceasefire as “temporary,” arguing that his goal of eradicating Hamas is not done. Moreover, the end of the war could mark the end of his time in office. He and his party, Likud, have done poorly in polls since the start of the war. This decline in approval rating, paired with a poll claiming 69% of Israelis want parliamentary elections “the day after the war ends,” could signal the termination of his time in office.

Because of the fragility in the region and the instability of the ceasefire, it is up to foreign pressure to enforce the end of the war. Despite the Trump administration’s commitment to the deal, it remains uncertain the degree of leverage they have over Netanyahu to ensure its implementation, especially after Hamas released the hostages (their most crucial bargaining chips). Ultimately, without substantial external intervention, both sides must honor their commitments to the ceasefire, prioritize effective humanitarian aid, and concentrate on reconstruction for any hope of lasting peace.

Russia and Iran 20-Year Treaty Strengthens Strategic Ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian. Evgenia Novozhenina/AFP via Getty Images

On January 17th, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian negotiated a 20-year defense treaty titled “The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement,” outlining new alliance policies between the two states. The deal covers a variety of topics, including science, trade, transportation, agriculture, military, intelligence, education, and culture, all of which are geared toward boosting trade and economic relations between Russia and Iran.

Among the agreed-upon policies, was a prohibition on either state giving aid to an aggressor attacking the other, as well as a policy barring the use of each other’s territory in a way that threatens the stability of the other. However, unlike the treaty between Russia and North Korea, a mutual defense clause requiring one country to come to the other’s defense in the event of an attack was not included. The exclusion of such a policy is particularly notable, as it could have potentially required Iran to get involved in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.  

Made just days before President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the negotiation announcement has led to worldwide speculation on the motivations behind its timing, with many pointing to the increasing pressure posed by strict Western sanctions and Trump’s “America First” foreign policy interests. With the American president promising to end the war in Ukraine and threatening a tougher stance on Iran, many believe this deal is meant to coordinate a joint-retaliation response and stir worry across the West.

Yet this deal is not a sudden decision, but rather the cumulation of months of negotiating that began when Pezeshkian took office last July, ultimately being signed on the first visit between these two presidents at the Kremlin. Building off a relationship that began after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and Iran have made a number of strategic moves together over the years, including the construction of Iran’s first nuclear power plant in 2013 and Iran’s entry into the BRICS bloc in 2023. The Syrian Civil War was also a crucial catalyst in the strengthening of bilateral relations, as the two states pooled efforts in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. An effort which, much to Putin and Pezeshkian’s chagrin, failed to prevent his downfall late last year. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to further strengthening of relations, as Moscow paid $1.7 billion for 11,000 Iranian Shahed drones to use in the conflict. Given the rich history between Russia and Iran, this treaty has become merely a formality between two well-acquainted allies.

Pezeshkian has even made direct comments on the Russia-Ukraine war, saying he hopes the war can be ended soon with peace talks and negotiations. He further stated that “war is not a good solution to resolve problems and we would welcome talks and achieving peace between... Russia and Ukraine,” emphasizing the need for a mediator to help the states resolve their disputes before tensions worsen and efforts to stabilize become even more difficult.

Looking toward the future of Russia, we can anticipate the construction of more nuclear projects in the region and the creation of a gas pipeline of 55 billion cubic meters per year to Iran via Azerbaijan, a goal which, despite setbacks, is still underway. "This [treaty] creates better conditions for bilateral cooperation in all areas," Putin stated, emphasizing that this “important new chapter” would expand ties and bolster trust and collaboration between the two countries for many years to come.

Saudi Arabia: Biden considers recognizing Palestinian state for Saudi normalization

Written by: Ella Rutman; Edited by: Aliyah Jaikaran  

On Wednesday, Saudia Arabia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement to the United States saying that it will not continue the ongoing normalization talks with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital. They added that Israeli forces must stop its “aggression” on the Gaza Strip and withdraw from the region in the ongoing Israel-Hamas war.   

The U.S. has spearheaded diplomacy between Saudi Arabia and Israel for months in the Saudi Deal. In exchange for normalized relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia would receive a U.S. defense pact and assistance in generating its own civilian nuclear program. Progress on the Saudi Deal has ceased as per Saudi Arabia’s demand for an independent Palestinian state.   

According to a senior official, the Biden Administration has assigned policy staff to explore options of the U.S. recognizing a Palestinian state before solidifying a complete postwar deal with Israel. If Palestine obtains statehood, Biden has said that it should be governed by a “revitalized” Palestinian authority, which currently narrowly controls some of the West Bank. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has opposed Palestinian control over the West Bank, further stagnating the Saudi Deal.    

At Thursday’s news conference, President Biden delivered his most piercing criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza, yet. The president declared Israel’s conduct in Gaza “over the top” and stated that innocent people dying and starving has “got to stop.” Biden emphasized his joint efforts with Qatar, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to get “as much aid as we possibly can into Gaza.”  

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s “strong interest in pursuing” normalization with Israel to U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken contingent on an end to the war in Gaza and a Palestinian state. Netanyahu has stated he will not compromise on total Israeli security west of the Jordan River, which contradicts a Palestinian state. The U.S. has repeated its support for the two-state solution. Talks of the Saudi Deal remain idle until concrete movement towards a Palestinian state is made.  

Iranian-backed militias: Biden decides how to respond to fatal drone attack

Written by: Aliyah Jaikaran; Edited by: Luke Wagner 

Three US soldiers were killed and at least 34 injured in a drone attack by “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” (IRI) – a coalition of militias backed by Iran – on a U.S. military base in Jordan near the Syrian border, says the Biden administration. The attack has intensified ongoing tensions in the Middle East since Hamas’ October 7th attacks on Israel, igniting the Israel-Hamas war and Israel’s depredation of Gaza. It is the first occurrence of fatalities among U.S. troops in the Middle East since the outburst of the Israel-Hamas war.  

The attack took place at Tower 22, a U.S. military outpost, in northeast Jordan where the borders of Iraq, Jordan, and Syria meet. The armed drone struck the outpost’s barracks.  

Speaking to a concerned nation, President Biden vowed to punish those responsible for these unprovoked attacks.  Biden then said, “I do hold [the Iranian Government] responsible [for the attacks] in that they’re supplying weapons to the people who did it.” However, direct confrontation between the two rivals seems at this moment unlikely. When asked if the President is considering a strike within Iranian territory, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said, “We are not looking for a war with Iran.” 

Like the Houthis in Yemen, IRI tried to justify its attacks as acts of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza.  The militias claimed that targeting U.S. military assets served as a “continuation” of its resistance against American occupation in Iraq after 2003.  

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani rejected allegations that Iran had helped plan or had commissioned the attack. Kanaani asserted that IRI and other militias act autonomously and do not carry out orders from Iran.  

Since Hamas’ October 7th attack on Israel, U.S. troops have been attacked more than 150 times by Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq which resulted in at least 70 wounded before January 28th’s drone attack in Jordan.  

On Wednesday, Biden publicly stated that he had decided on his course of action. As of Friday February 2nd, the United States has not yet responded. 

Israel-Hamas War: Why has the Global South supported the genocide case against Israel?

Written by: Luke Wagner; Edited by: Chloe Baldauf

On Friday, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the allegations claiming Israel had committed acts in violation of the United Nations 1948 Genocide Convention were “plausible” enough to justify the court’s continued deliberation of the case.  The South African Government brought the case to the international court alleging that “acts and omissions” by Israel in its offensive in Gaza have been “genocidal in character” because they are intended to bring about the “destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian [people].”

The ICJ case’s strongest proponents have been states of the Global South.  Many Muslim-majority states such as Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and the Maldives have supported South Africa’s case.  Additionally, many Latin American and African states have been among the loudest proponents of the genocide case against Israel.

Jakkie Cilliers, founder of the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies think tank, said that the Western support for Ukraine and Israel has made many African nations feel neglected while they continue to face their own struggles.  Cilliers suggested that this shared feeling is perhaps why many in the Global South have come to identify strongly with the Palestinian cause.

Johann Soufi, an international lawyer and former legal office chief at the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) in Gaza, said that many nations in the Global South feel that the international system has never worked for them and are frustrated to see the international community respond quickly to the concerns of the West – like Russian aggression against Ukraine and Hamas’ October 7th attacks.  Many in the Global South view international justice increasingly as “selective justice” and a reflection of a “neo-colonial” status quo, according to Mr. Soufi.

In early January, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken called South Africa’s accusations of genocide “meritless” and a distraction from efforts to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza although the US has refrained from making any public comments on the trial.  Washington’s strong support of Israel has made it isolated among members of the Global South who wish that the United States were more willing to criticize Israel.  Steven Gruzd, head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Program at the South African Institute of International Affairs, said that “African states are beginning to identify more strongly with the global south [identity] than the US.”  According to Ms. Cilliers, “the momentum has swung to Russia and China.”  

These are concerning trends for US diplomats not only in Africa but also in Latin American and Muslim-majority states.  This week, Secretary Blinken is traveling throughout the African continent this past week, presumably to rekindle some connections and show some attention to a region which has felt sorely neglected during the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.  Additionally, Blinken spoke with South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor on Thursday to discuss the conflict in Gaza, including “the need to protect civilian lives,” provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians, and work towards lasting peace that “ensures Israel’s security and advances the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.” 

If alienating members of the Global South becomes an issue of greater American concern, it is possible that more conversations about the future of Gaza include African and Latin American states.

Yemen: Houthi leader says that direct confrontation with the US is a “great honor”

Written by: Katie Barnett; Edited by: Luke Wagner

On Thursday, the United States conducted its fifth round of airstrikes against the Houthis, an Iranian-backed rebel group based in western Yemen.  Purportedly in response to Israel’s military operation in Gaza, Houthi militants have launched missiles at Israel and hijacked cargo ships passing through the Red Sea.

The Houthis have claimed that all of the ships they attacked were Israeli-owned or operated, but many have been commercial ships with no connection to the Government of Israel – such as Tuesday when Houthi missiles directly hit a Greek cargo vessel.  Houthi Red Sea attacks have severely impacted international trade and many major shipping companies have stopped using the Red Sea route – opting for the much longer route around southern Africa.

The United States and the United Kingdom militarily intervened in the Red Sea earlier this week.  On Thursday, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh explained that the United States determined that the Houthis “presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and U.S. Navy ships in the region.”

Ms. Singh asserted that the US is not at war with the Houthis and does not want to see a regional conflict. However, Ms. Singh was emphatic that U.S. intervention will continue until the Houthis stop their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

President Joe Biden echoed Ms. Singh’s remarks on Thursday – affirming the necessity of U.S. military action while acknowledging that the strikes have not stopped the Houthis thus far.

Meanwhile, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi called it “a great honor” to be “in direct confrontation” with the United States and Israel.  This statement indicated that the Iranian-backed militant group would not back off from its aggressive position easily.  It seems that a direct conflict with the United States is exactly what the Houthis aim for.  Perhaps, a war with the West would please its benefactors in Tehran.  As for now, Al-Houthi has shown no intention to bring an end to the conflict in the Red Sea.